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Abstract—We report the first quantum key distribution (QKD)
systems capable of delivering sustainable, real-time secure keys
continuously at rates exceeding 10 Mb/s. To achieve such rates,
we developed high speed post-processing modules, achieving
maximum data throughputs of 60 MC/s, 55 Mb/s, and 108 Mb/s
for standalone operation of sifting, error correction and pri-
vacy amplification modules, respectively. The photonic layer of
the QKD systems features high-speed single photon detectors
based on self-differencing InGaAs avalanche photodiodes, phase
encoding using asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer, and
active stabilization of the interferometer phase and photon
polarisation. An efficient variant of the decoy-state BB84 protocol
is implemented for security analysis, with a large dataset size
of 108 bits selected to mitigate finite-size effects. Over a 2 dB
channel, a record secure key rate of 13.72 Mb/s has been achieved
averaged over 4.4 days of operation. We confirm the robustness
and long-term stability on a second QKD system continuously
running for 1 month without any user intervention.
Index Terms—Quantum Cryptography; Information Security;
Fiber Optics
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1], [2] provides a means
for exchanging cryptographic keys, the security of which
makes no assumptions about an adversary’s computing power
or technological capability. Its potential for real-world use
has stimulated a number of different implementations, ranging
from prepare-measure to entanglement-based, weak-pulse to
continuous variables, or free-space to fibre optics [3], [4],
[5]. Constant efforts have been devoted towards extending the
communication distance and the secure key rate (SKR): two
key figures of merit defining the performance [5]. Recently,
point-to-point QKD links have been deployed on installed fiber
to form quantum networks [6], which can be used to safeguard
communication infrastructures that underpin today’s society.
Increasing the SKR is arguably the most pressing task in
order to widen the applicable areas of the QKD technology.
Firstly, practical applications often require a minimum band-
width, e.g., encryption of live speech requires a bit rate on
the order of 10 kb/s while sharing human Genome data and
distributed secure storage would desire a rate much higher
than 1 Mb/s [7]. Secondly, a higher bandwidth would enable a
network to provide simultaneous service to a larger number of
users or user applications. However, achieving a sustainable,
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Fig. 1. QKD data flow.
high SKR requires improvements in all aspects of a QKD
system, from protocol to hardware. Figure 1 shows schemati-
cally the data flow among different layers in a QKD system. It
starts from the lowest, photonic layer dealing with preparation,
transmission and detection of optical signals, followed by data
post-processing layers including sifting, error correction (EC)
and privacy amplification (PA), facilitated by an authenticated
data communication channel. Between EC and PA, there is a
module for determining the amount of privacy amplification
required in order to remove any information that might be
known to an adversary (Eve), based on the security proof of the
implemented QKD protocol. As they are executed sequentially,
the final secure key rate will be determined by the slowest
layer.
The photonic layer has in the past limited the key rate. With
recent advances in single-photon detector technologies, the
bottleneck has shifted upwards to the post-processing layers
and the sustained secure rate has improved steadily from
several kb/s to a current record level of 1.9 Mb/s [8]. A higher
key rate has not been possible because of the speed limitation
imposed by the data-processing layers. We note that EC and
PA were implemented in software running on general-purpose
CPU’s in the state-of-the-art system [8].
Hardware acceleration has been recognized as the key to
improve the post-processing throughput [9], [10]. However,
each layer requires different resources, adding to the com-
plexity in hardware implementation. Sifting requires high
communication bandwidth as well as its efficient use in order
to cope with exchanging reconciliation messages at sufficiently
high rates, while its computational operation is simple and
involves mainly memory look up and binary bit comparison.
In contrast, EC and PA are computationally intensive, with
the latter requiring significant memory resources to process
datasets of very large size (108 bits) in order to mitigate
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2statistical finite size effects.
Here, we report the first QKD systems capable of delivering
sustainable secure keys at a rate in excess of 10 Mb/s. This
achievement was enabled by our development of sifting and
control electronics, field-programmable gate array (FPGA)
based low-density parity check (LPDC) EC and co-processor
based PA modules. Together with a high speed photonic layer,
this new hardware has enabled a sustainable, real-time SKR of
13.72± 0.74 Mb/s over a channel loss of 2 dB, equivalent to
10 km fiber. The system robustness has been confirmed by one
month continuous operation of a second system over a 2 dB
quantum channel formed by fiber and delivering an average
SKR of 11.53 Mb/s.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH SECURE KEY RATES
In a qubit-based QKD system, the obtainable SKR (R)
between the transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Bob) can be
expressed as
R = fηdηsift
{
p1 [1− h (e1)]− fech(e)
}
, (1)
where f is the system clock frequency, ηd is the detection
probability of signal pulses, ηsift < 1 the sifting coefficient
which is defined as the proportion of the system time slots
that contribute to generation of sifted keys, p1 is the lower
bound for the probability that a sifted count arises from the
detection of a single photon state prepared by Alice, e1 is the
upper bound of the phase error rate of the single photon states,
and e is the quantum bit error rate (QBER) in the sifted key.
h(x) = −x log2 x− (1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary Shannon
entropy, representing the fraction of information that has to
be revealed by a perfect EC algorithm in order to correct a
binary data block with an error ratio of x. fec (> 1) is the co-
efficiency of the actual employed EC algorithm, and fech(e)
represents the amount of information disclosed by it.
Inferring from Eq. 1, we may list below the requirements
for high SKRs:
1) A photonic layer of transmitting and detecting optical
pulses at high clock rates (f ) and high detection prob-
ability (ηd); ηd here includes the quantum channel loss.
For fiber-optical QKD systems, their SKRs decrease
exponentially with the communication distance. Hence,
high SKRs favour short or low-loss fiber channels.
2) The sifting electronics that can handle a raw count rate
greater than fηd;
3) A QKD protocol that enables efficient extraction (ηsift)
of sifted keys from raw photon detection events; We note
that the standard BB84 protocol features ηsift ≤ 0.5. An
efficient protocol allows also tight bounds for parameters
p1 and e1.
4) A robust control hardware that is able to maintain the
alignment between the transmitter and receivers’ optical
apparatus so as to have a low QBER (e) and a high
proportion of time slots for transmitting quantum keys;
time slots used for stabilising the system should be kept
minimal.
5) An EC implementation that has a low information leak-
age (fEC → 1);
6) A PA implementation that must be able to handle large
dataset size to mitigate finite-size effects arising from
statistical fluctuations in the measured quantities;
7) Finally, both EC and PA modules must have data
throughput greater than the sifted key rate (fηdηsift).
To achieve 10 Mb/s secure key rates would require EC/PA
throughput of 40 Mb/s and sifting throughput of 50 MC/s,
when considering typical experimental parameters found in
previous QKD implementations [8].
III. PROTOCOL
Early QKD security proofs were developed in the so-
called “asymptotic scenario”, where it is assumed that an
infinite dataset is available to the experimenters, who can thus
determine the QKD parameters with infinite precision. This
is clearly unphysical. In a real situation, the dataset is always
finite and the measurement precision is therefore limited by
the statistical fluctuations in the sample. To correct this, we
introduced in 2012 the “T12” protocol [11], which features
composable security against collective attacks in the finite-size
scenario and provides high key distribution rates.
In the T12 protocol, the transmitter (Alice) prepares at
random one out of four quantum states indicated as |0〉Z ,
|1〉Z (majority and data basis Z) and |0〉X , |1〉X (minority and
test basis X), similarly to the well-known BB84 protocol. The
bases are selected with probability pZ ≥ 1/2 and pX = 1−pZ
and the secure key rate of the protocol is given by the sum of
the rates distilled separately in the two bases. This makes it
possible to optimize the parameter pX to achieve the highest
possible key rate. An optimal choice is often found to be
pX < 1/16 [11], which entails that only a small fraction
(2pXpZ < 0.125) of detected counts are discarded due to
non-matching bases.
For each state, one of three photon fluxes, u (signal), v
(decoy) or w (vacuum), are randomly selected with probabili-
ties pu, pv and pw, respectively, to enable the implementation
of the decoy-state technique [12], [13]. The decoy-state es-
timation routine is carried out numerically for every dataset
acquired by the system, making it possible to optimise the
values of the photon fluxes and their preparation probabilities.
The T12 protocol can easily tolerate security parameters as
small as 10−10, even in presence of dataset sizes as small as
105, although much larger dataset sizes are necessary in order
to reduce statistical finite-size effects and allow efficient key
generation. We choose our dataset size as 100 Mb for our QKD
systems. This choice allows 85% of the asymptotic secure key
rate, and remains manageable by our privacy amplification
module which will be described later. For a system gener-
ating 100-Mb keys every 100 seconds, the security parameter
(10−10) corresponds to a failure probability equal to one single
event in 30,000 years. Despite such a strict security parameter,
the T12 protocol provides a typical secure key rate in excess
of 1 Mb/s over an optical fibre length of 50 km [11]. Record
rates were reported using this protocol for several distances up
to 240 km [14], even in presence of the noise introduced by
classical channels multiplexed with the quantum channel [8].
The security in the protocol can be rigorously quantified
by relating it to the size of the experimental data sample.
3TABLE I
LIST OF PARAMETER SETTINGS IN THE IMPLEMENTED T12 PROTOCOL. f :
SYSTEM CLOCK FREQUENCY; u, v, w AND pu, pv , pw : PHOTON FLUXES
AND RESPECTIVE PROBABILITIES FOR SIGNAL, DECOY AND VACUUM
PULSES; pZ , pX : Z AND X BASIS PROBABILITIES; pst : PROBABILITY OF
PULSES USED FOR ACTIVE PHASE COMPENSATION; : PROTOCOL
SECURITY PARAMETER.
Parameter Setting
f 1 GHz
u, v, w 0.4, 0.1, 0.0007
pu, pv , pw 96.973%, 1.661% 1.466%
pZ , pX 96.677%, 3.323%
pst 1/128
PA dataset 100.66 Mb
 10−10
The simplicity of the protocol further allows to incorporate
additional assumptions of the QKD theory which are not
currently met in the implementation, thus reducing the existing
gap between these two aspects of QKD [15], [16]. For the
same reason, it can be easily exported to other systems and
situations in which a worst-case analysis becomes compelling.
In the present QKD systems, the T12 protocol is imple-
mented with operation parameters listed in Table I, with aim
to achieve high SKRs at short fiber distances. Here, Z−basis
counts are used for key distillation while the full information
of X-basis counts is revealed for phase error estimation. The
sifting efficiency is 0.90, obtained from
ηsift = (1− pst) · pu · p2Z , (2)
where pst is the fraction of time slots that are used for phase
stabilization. Such sifting efficiency is almost twice as efficient
as the standard BB84 protocol. With a typical QBER of 3%
and PA dataset size of 108 bits, its PA compression ratio is
found to be about 0.29, i.e., on average 0.29 secure bits can
be distilled per bit in the error-corrected key.
IV. SYSTEM HARDWARE
Figure 2 shows the schematics of the QKD hardware. Quan-
tum transmitter and receiver are housed in 19-inch 2U rack
units, consisting both optics and control/sifting electronics,
while EC/PA hardware are hosted in the 1U servers. Standard
10G Ethernet interfaces are used for local communication
between server and sifting electronics or for remote commu-
nication between Alice and Bob’s sifting electronics.
Fig. 2. Schematics for experimental setup. Quantum transmitter/receiver
is housed in a 2U 19-inch rack unit. 10G communication interfaces are
chosen to handle and route all classical communications. The EC/PA hardware
accelerators are housed inside the control servers.
Fig. 3. Optics. Dark shaded components are active optical components
that are controlled by sifting/control electronics. DWDM: dense wavelength
division multiplexing module; PBC/PBS: polarisation beam combiner/splitter;
Att: electrically controlled variable optical attenuator.
A. Optics
Figure 3 shows the optical layout of the QKD system. Four
optical wavelengths (λ1 – λ4) are used to transmitting optical
signals between the QKD transmitter (Alice) and receiver
(Bob). Three wavelengths are assigned to classical signals
and transmitted through a single fiber using standard DWDM
100G-spaced multiplexers. The classical channels include a
10 Gb/s bidirectional data link for QKD sifting and reconcili-
ation (λ3: 1529.55 nm, λ4: 1528.77 nm) and a unidirectional,
pulsed transmitter-receiver pair (λ2: 1531.22 nm) for clock
synchronisation. The quantum signal (λ1: 1550.12 nm) is
presently transmitted through a separate fiber, but can be
integrated into the same fibre that carries data in future.
The quantum sub-system implements the T12 protocol using
optical pulses of three different intensities. A gain-switched
DFB laser diode, in combination with an intensity modulator
and optical attenuator, is used to generate these optical pulses
at the wavelength of 1550.12 nm (λ1) and a clock rate of
1 GHz, with their fluxes set at three different values to
implement the decoy state technique, 0.4 (stabilization and sig-
nal), 0.08 (decoy) and 0.0007 (vacuum) photons/pulse. Gain-
switching of the laser ensures global phase randomization [17],
[18] which is a precondition to apply decoy-state analysis,
while use of a single laser source prevents encoding side-
channels. Quantum information is encoded upon optical phase
using an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer (AMZI),
which splits each input pulse into a pair of pulses of orthogonal
polarizations.
At the receiver’s side, a matching AMZI decodes the phase
information and directs the quantum signals into two room-
temperature InGaAs avalanche photodiodes operating in self-
differencing mode [19], [20]. The detectors are temporally
aligned so that only the photons that have passed through
the short arm of one AMZI and the long arm of the other
AMZI are detected. These detectors feature ultrashort detec-
tion deadtime and > 100 MC/s count rates. The receiver’s
interferometer loss is about 2 dB.
In order for continuous operation, the quantum sub-system
needs to maintain the photon polarisation, the interferometer
phase delay, and the photon arrival time because the effects of
environmental changes in both the transmission fibers and the
QKD unit locations can cause disturbances in the transmitted
quantum states. The active stabilization is realized through
4applying compensation signals to various active components.
Alice applies the polarisation control using her electrically
driven polarization controller, while Bob performs phase sta-
bilization and detector gate delay optimization.
B. Control and sifting electronics
Custom-made FPGA boards were developed to control
the QKD optics and handle the signal sifting. Alice and
Bob’s boards are identical in terms of physical hardware, but
differ in their loaded programmes. They handle optical signal
modulation, photon detection time tagging, active stabilisation
of optics, random number generation, sifting and packet data
communication/routing. Each FPGA board has a 10G SFP+
interface (850 nm) connecting locally to its control server,
and a second 10G SFP+ interface (λ2, λ3) for remote com-
munication via the data fiber link with its peer FPGA board.
As can be seen in Fig. 2, these 10G links form a daisy chain
to carry all data communications between different modules
of the QKD system.
Alice’s FPGA board provides high speed driving signals
at a clock rate of 1 GHz to the quantum laser, phase
modulators and intensity modulator. Digital delay lines are
used to temporarily align these signals in order to achieve
desired modulation to the quantum signal. Alice’s FPGA board
transmits clock signal optically to Bob. Bob’s board produces
modulation signals similarly to Alice’s, but additionally im-
plements high speed time-tagging to record incoming photon
detection events. To meet the requirement by T12 protocol,
the basis and decoy modulation channels are designed to have
selectable settings for the probabilities of pX , pu, pv and pw.
We use active stabilization to compensate any drift in the
ambient conditions. The photon polarisation and arrival time
are corrected by maximizing the total detection rates through
applying DC voltages to the electrically-driven polarisation
controller at Alice and the gate delays to single photon
detectors at Bob, respectively. To stabilize the interferometer
phase, the count rate of the unmodulated stabilization pulses
is used as a feedback to adjust the voltage that is applied to
the DC input to Bob’s phase modulator.
Sifting, including both basis reconciliation and decoy-state
statistics collection, is completed in the hardware level with a
proved capacity of 60 MC/s.
C. Error Correction module
Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) based EC [21], [22]
was selected to satisfy the requirement for high throughput
(>40 Mb/s) post processing. LDPC codes have several ad-
vantages in this regard. They have very low communication
complexity, requiring only a single unidirectional message
between the transmitter and receiver, with the result that
communication latency does not reduce the throughput. This
is in contrast to protocols such as Cascade [23] which require
many round trip messages.
LDPC decoding algorithms are also widely studied and
implemented, with optimised algorithms offering good com-
promises between computational complexity, revealing extra
redundant information and failure probability [22], [24]. For
Fig. 4. EC efficiency as a function of QBER for the LDPC-EC implementation
based on FPGA.
high throughput algorithms with lower computational com-
plexity are generally used, with some trade off in the extra
information revealed and so final secure key rate.
The structure of the decoding algorithm, combined with
the simple communication complexity, also allows for the EC
process to be readily parallelised. This is an important factor
for achieving high decoding throughput, and also makes LDPC
decoders suitable for implementing using graphical processing
units (GPU) and FPGA for very high throughput [25], [10].
We have previously realized a GPU implementation, whose
throughput is slightly below the requirement for a 10 Mb/s
QKD system [25]. Therefore, we choose here to implement
the LDPC algorithm onto a pair of FPGA cards, each of
which is plugged into a PCIe slot in Alice’s or Bob’s server.
Alice’s card parallelizes syndrome generation while Bob’s card
handles decoding.
We select quasi-cyclic LDPC code for its compact imple-
mentation, and proposed a new decoding routine [26] in order
to prevent performance deterioration in its FPGA implemen-
tation. We implement code rate adaptive modulation so as to
achieve an optimal EC efficiency. The code rate, and hence the
amount of information disclosed by EC, is determined by the
QBER in the EC data block. We determine the EC efficiency
of the FPGA-LDPC implementation to be from 1.13 to 1.20
for QBER’s between 2% and 10%, as shown in Fig. 4.
The above efficiencies are achievable only when the number
of errors in the sifted data block are precisely known. Process-
ing real QKD data, the efficiencies will become slightly poorer
as will be reported later in Section IV, because the QBER is
not precisely known before EC taking place. The LDPC code
rate and the syndrome data calculation have to rely on an
estimated QBER, obtained via revealing a small sample in the
sifted data block. An underestimation of QBER will increase
LDPC decoding failure probability, and to avoid this a margin
on top of the estimated QBER is used to determine the LDPC
code rate and therefore reduces the EC efficiency.
In the FPGA-LDPC implementation, we set each EC data
block to be 1 Mb, of which 8 kb is revealed for error
estimation. The remaining data is divided into sub-blocks to
be error corrected in parallel. If decoding of all sub-blocks is
verified to be successful, the corrected data block is transferred
5to the PA process. Otherwise, the whole block of the sifted
key is discarded. Our test reveals the EC throughput to be
55 Mb/s, sufficient to support 10 Mb/s SKRs.
D. Privacy amplification module
Privacy amplification (PA) is an essential post-processing
step in QKD. Its function is to compress a length of error-
corrected key into a shorter one thus removing information
known to Eve via her interception of either optical transmis-
sion, error correction stages or both. The simplest approach
is direct matrix multiplication, which has computational com-
plexity of O(n2). It is feasible with CPU implementations
for small dataset sizes (≤ 105 bits), but rapidly becomes
troublesome with larger dataset sizes. FPGA implementations
have often been used to speed up PA process with a dataset size
of up to 106 bits [9], [27], [10], [28]. However, such dataset
size is still two orders of magnitude smaller than 108 bits, a
desirable size [11] to mitigate statistical finite-size effects.
To overcome this problem, we first apply number theoretical
transform (NTT) technique [29] to Toeplitz matrix multiplica-
tion, a transformation that belongs to the family of universal-
2 hash functions. This technique reduces the computational
complexity from O(n2) to O(n log n). We note that an alter-
native PA approach [30], i.e., Scho¨nhage-Strassen algorithm
based multiplication of large integers, has a good but slightly
higher computational complexity of O(n log n log log n). A
CPU implementation of the NTT algorithm has given a PA
throughput of 28.22 Mb/s at a dataset size of 108 bits [31].
While being a significant improvement over direct matrix
multiplication, it remains insufficient for 10 Mb/s secure key
rates.
We then resort to exploiting massive parallelism offered
by Intel R© Xeon PhiTM coprocessors to further improve the
PA throughput. In order to efficiently utilize the coproces-
sor for matrix multiplication, we apply several programming
techniques: vectorization for matrix transpose and butterfly
computation of NTT, suitable instruction set regarding cache
hit ratio, loop unrolling to butterfly computation for reducing
the number of iterations, parallelization by multi-thread pro-
cessing of data input and output, and parallelization of matrix
multiplication and secure key length estimation.
The implementation supports a variable dataset size up
to 227 bits (134 Mb), thanks to the reduced computational
complexity by NTT implementation. We note that ∼100 Mb
dataset size is necessary to give a high secure key rate owing
to finite-size effects in the extraction of secure keys. At this
dataset size, our evaluation on the NTT implementation gives
a throughput of 108.77 Mb/s. This throughput can support a
secure key rate exceeding 20 Mb/s in the T12 protocol even
when the QBER is 5%.
In our QKD systems, we choose 100.66 Mb (96× 1024×
1024 bits) as the PA dataset size and the PA module allows a
maximum compression ratio of 1/3.
V. SYSTEM EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE
We constructed two QKD systems which were subsequently
used for evaluating their secure key rates. In their evaluations,
Fig. 5. Sifted and secure bit rates and the QBER as a function of time,
obtained from 4.4-days continuous operation of System-I. The quantum
channel is formed by a short spool of fibre and its channel loss is set to
be 2 dB, equivalent to the loss of 10 km standard single mode fiber with a
loss rate of 0.2 dB/km.
the quantum channel loss was set to 2 dB, equivalent to the
loss of 10 km standard single mode fiber with a loss rate of
0.2 dB/km. All sifting, EC and PA processes are pipelined and
performed in real time with secure keys written to hard drives.
The QKD control software was configured to log control,
sifting, EC and PA parameters for off-line analysis.
Systems I and II ran continuously for 4.4 days and 1
month, respectively, without any user intervention during the
evaluations.
A. Record secure key rate
System I is equipped with two room-temperature InGaAs
single photon detectors featuring a detection efficiency of 31%,
a combined dark count rate of 450 kHz and an afterpulsing
probability of 4.4%. In the test, its 2 dB quantum channel was
formed by a 400 m fiber spool and additional attenuation from
an optical attenuator.
Figure 5 shows the sifted and secure rates and QBER. All
these data were reported at an interval of every 100.66 Mb suc-
cessfully reconciled keys or approximately 2 seconds duration,
obtained from the PA routine. The system reports stable sifted
key rate, measured to be 47.83 ± 0.22 Mb/s with a standard
deviation of 0.5%, and a stable QBER of (3.07± 0.05)%, as
shown in Fig. 5. The detector afterpulsing makes the biggest
contribution (2.2%) to the measured QBER.
LDPC-based EC suffers from a non-zero decoding failure
probability, and the EC control software performs a verifi-
cation process after correcting each EC data block. Once
an EC failure is confirmed by its verification procedure,
the entire data block is discarded and does not enter the
subsequent PA process. We determine the failure probability
to be (0.73± 0.15)%, as shown in Fig. 6. The inset shows the
EC coefficient as a function of QBER. Unlike the theoretical
result in Fig. 4, fEC is not a singular value for each QBER
value. This is because the LDPC code rate and hence the
corresponding fEC value are determined by the estimated
QBER. At 3.0% QBER, fEC = 1.32−1.36, which is slightly
less efficient than the value of 1.19, obtained in Fig. 4 with a
precisely known QBER. This degradation is attributed to the
inevitable error in the estimation of QBER.
6Fig. 6. Low-density parity-check error correction (LDPC-EC) failure prob-
ability. The inset shows the EC information leakage, compared with the
theoretical minimum.
Despite the degraded EC efficiencies, it is still possible to
achieve a high PA compression ratio, i.e., the ratio of the
number of secret bits to the number of error corrected bits,
thanks to the low QBER. Figure 7 shows the compression ratio
obtained during the test period, measured as 0.292 ± 0.016.
On average, the system distills 29.39 Mb secure bits per
100.66 Mb error-corrected keys. We show the secure key rate a
function of time in Fig. 5. Its value fluctuates slightly stronger
than the sifted key rate, because of its sensitivity to the QBER
and the decoy counts statistics. Nevertheless, all the secure rate
values, except for a few data points, stay well above 10 Mb/s.
The fluctuation in the secure key rate is measured to be 5.4%.
From the actual amount of secure key materials written into
the hard drives, we determine the average secure key rate to
be 13.72 Mb/s for the test duration, with a total of 5.2 Tb key
materials generated. This is the first time for any QKD system
to ever obtain a secure key rate exceeding 10 Mb/s.
B. Long-term system stability
System II is identical to the first one, but differs in the
performance of single photon detectors. Its detectors have a
slightly lower detection efficiency (28%) than those in the first
Fig. 7. The PA compression ratio vs. QBER obtained from the 4.4 days test.
Fig. 8. One month continuous operation of System II. (a) Sifted and secure
key rates and the QBER; Insets: 24-h records of the DC bias values applied
to Bob’s phase modulator (left) and Alice’s electrically driven polarization
controller (right). (b) Total amount of secure key bits accumulated.
system, but have comparable afterpulsing and dark count rate
performance.
For better evaluation of the system stability, it is desirable
to use long fiber spools because they provide a more realistic
scenario of photon polarisation drift and fluctuation. As we
did not have 10 km fiber spools available at the time, two
25 km fiber spools were used instead, one for the quantum
channel and one for data communication and synchronization.
Each 25 km fiber spool has a loss of 5 dB. To maintain
the same quantum channel loss as System I, we compensate
this extra loss by increasing the photon fluxes leaving Alice’s
unit. It is equivalent to view Alice’s system consisting of
15 km of the total fiber spool, and the quantum channel is
formed effectively by the remaining 10 km fiber with 2 dB
loss. We stress that this approach does not weaken our result
as compared with using 10 km fiber spools, because extra
fiber can only deteriorate the system performance due to the
increased polarisation instability.
We subject System II to a 1 month test for evaluating the
robustness of the system, with the result shown in Fig. 8. The
sifted and secure key rates and the QBER are measured to
be 42.21± 1.65 Mb/s, 11.53± 0.65 Mb/s, and 3.16± 0.07%,
respectively. The fluctuations of the measured quantities are
slightly larger than System I, due to the extra instability
from the 25 km fiber spool. However, all these quantities
show excellent stability, illustrating the robustness of the
active stabilisation routine. The insets of Fig. 8 show the
voltage biases applied to Bob’s phase modulator and Alice’s
electrically driven polarisation controller over 24 h on the 31st
day. The key rates are about 16% lower than System I, which
is attributed to the lower detection efficiencies of the InGaAs
detectors and a slightly higher QBER. Nevertheless, the secure
bit rate has stayed over 10 Mb/s over the entire period.
A total of 31.35 Tb secure key materials were generated in
this test, see Fig. 8(b).
7VI. CONCLUSION
We have developed and successfully demonstrated high
bit rate QKD systems capable of generation of real-time
secure keys at a sustainable rate exceeding 10 Mb/s. To
achieve this rate, we have made remarkable improvement
on the data throughput by successful development of QKD
post-processing modules, with respective individual maximum
throughput of 60 MC/s, 55 Mb/s and 108 Mb/s for sifting,
error correction and privacy amplification. We have integrated
these modules into a compact QKD system, and achieved
a record secure key rate of 13.72 Mb/s over 2 dB loss
channel, equivalent to 10 km standard telecom fiber. The
system robustness on real fiber is confirmed with a 1-month
continuous operation over a quantum channel with its 2 dB
loss made from 10 km fiber.
The QKD systems introduced here represents almost an
order of magnitude increase in the secure key distribution
rate, from previously 1.9 Mb/s [8] to 13.72 Mb/s. Furthermore
this is complete system, with all layers of the system able
to operate at this speed without bottlenecks. This scaled up
key rate makes it viable to use the systems as a backbone
in a large quantum network, allowing multiple users to share
the link simultaneously while providing each with Mb/s key
rates for the first time. This is especially relevant as most
recent deployments of QKD systems are focusing on network
configurations, due to their inherent advantages in redundancy
and reach.
When used in a dedicated link configuration the system can
provide key rates to allow for the most secure one time pad
encryption of all typical types of communication, including
voice, video, medical and financial data. This ability should
allow for the ultra high security provided by QKD to be
deployed in a wide range of applications.
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